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The primary question presented is whether LEAA

officials are absolutely immune f om personal damages liability
f or failing to irtitiate administrative proceedings to

t er~inate

LEAA funding to state and local law enforcement agenci es that
allegedly were engaging in discriminatory personnel practices .
Petrs contend (l) that the CA erred in rejecting their absol ute

1 The SG has filed ape :·1on on
· f of Richard w.
Velde, LEAA Administrator, dward II. Levi former Attorney
Gene ral , Charles n. Work, D·AA Deputy Adm' 1istrator, and Herbert
C. Rice, Director of LEAA 0[ · 1 "'
~
Righ t.s Compl i2lnce.
i .

•

·
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immunity claim and (2) that if they are not absolutely immune,
the CA should have held that resps failed to state a cause of
action for damages under the Fifth Amendment or that petrs are
entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.
2.

FACTS & DECISION BELOW:

In 1975, resps -- six blacks,

six women and an organization that represents black police
offic ers -- filed a suit against petrs in USDC (D.D.C).

Resps

alleged that state and local law enforcement agencies that had
received and were receiving LEAA grants had discriminated against
them,2 and that the LEAA, the De ~ 't of Justice, and petrs3 had
unlawfully failed to terminate LEAA f unding to these agencies,
despite evidence that the funds had been used to discriminate on
grounds of race and sex.

(

Resps sought declaratory and injunctive

relief and also sought compensatory and punitive damages against
petrs in their individual capacities.
Section 518 (c) (1) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (''the Act") prohibits any recipient of LEAA
funds from discriminating on the basis o f "race, color, national
origin or sex."

42 U.S.C. §37G6 (c) (1).

The Act provides f.or the

ter mination of LEAA funding to recipients that violate this
prohibition.

[I shall describe these provisions as they existed

at the time this suit was filed, although the

~revisions

were

2Resps alleged that they were denied employment, passed
over for promotion, or discharged solely on the basis of their
race or sex by recipien ts of LEAA funds.
3Petrs ar~ listed in not2 1, supra.
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amended in 1976.]

Section 518 (c) (2), 42

u.s.c. §3766 (c) (2),

provides that whenever the LEAA determines that a recipient of
LEAA funds is discriminating or otherwise failing to comply with
LEAA's regulations,
"[LEAA] shall notify the chief executive of the State of
the noncompliance and shall request the chief executive
to secure compliance. If within a reasonable time after
such notification the chief executive fails or refuses to
secure compliance, the [LEAA) shall exercise the powers
and functions provided in section 3757 . . . . "
42

u.s.c. §3757 (s ection 509 of

~he

Act) provides that if after

reasonable notice and an opportu nity for a hearing, the LEAA
finds that "there is a substantial failure to comply," it "shall
notify such applicant or grantee that further payment shall not
be made (or in its discretion that further payment shall not be

( _?

made for activities in which there is such failure), until there
is no longer such failure."

In 1976, noting that the LEAA had

not terminated its funding of any recipient pursuant to these
sections, Congress added more detailed procedures to be followed
by the LEAA in securing compliance with the antidiscrimination
in

provi s ion ana/terminating funds to noncomplying recipi ents .
In 1976 the DC dismis sed resps' suit , holding:

(1) the 1976

amendments had rend ered moot recps' claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief, and (2) resps ' claims for morietary damages
against petrs in their individu a l capacities were barred by the
doctrine of absolute immunity.

A divided CA reversed.

The CADC [B azelon, Parker (DJ)) held that the 1976
amendments bad not rendered moot resps' request for injunctive
and declaratory relief.

It also held that the DC had erred in
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dismissing resps' claims for damages on the ground of absolute
immunity.

'

Relying on Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the

CA stated that as a general rule federal officials may only rely
on the doctrine of qualified immunity in su its raising
constitutional violations.

Absolute immunity is provided only

where "essential for the conduct of the public business."

u.s. 507.

438

Absolute immunity is necessary to protect

discretionary prosecutorial decisions from the potentially
distorting effect of civil lia bil ity.

However, petrs had

virtually no discretion under the relevant statute in deciding
whether to terminate LEAA funding of discriminatory recipients:
"The mandatory language of 42 u.s.c. § 3766(c) (2)
• • . when read in ligh t of [petrs']
constitutional and independent statutory duty not
to allow federal funding to be used in a
discriminatory manner by recipi ents, takes
[petrs'] civil rights enforcement duties outside
the realm of discretion.
"The minimal matters le ft to LEAA's judgment-such as the assessment of 'reasonable time after
notification'--do not rise to the level of
prosecutorial discretion that is protected by
absolute i mmun i ty ." (P etn, at 6a & n.l5).
The CA concluded that resps "should be allowed to go to
tri al on th ei r clai ms for damag es" and that petrs could seck to
establish a defense of qualified immunity.4

4rrhe majority also held tl1c:~t resps had standing to
maintain their suit. It stated th at the police o ff icers'
association had alleged harm to itself and its members as a
result of petrs' alleged failure to terminate funding to
discriminatory recipients and that the i ndividual appellants had
alleged violations of their right to be free from federal funding
of state and local agencie~ that have discriminated against them.
Furthermore,

-5-

Judge Tamm agreed with Judge Bazelon's analysis of the
mootness issue, but disagreed with the majority's holding on
absolute immuni ty.

First, he asserted that decisions not to

prosecute must be given the same protection as decisions to
prosecute.

Second, he stated that the type of decision-making

entrusted to petrs is exactly what the Supreme Court had in mind
when it spoke of functions

11

analogous to those of the

[t]he 1976 amendments to the Omnibus Crime Control Act,
which added a judicial review provision for parties such
as appellants, remove any doubt as to appellants'
standing . . •. and we are satisfied that--absent a failure
of proof after discovery is completed--appellants have
standing to maintain this action ...
(Petn, at 7a, n.l6)
11

(_

Judge Tamm agreed that resps had standing, although he
considered it a more difficult issue than did the majority. As
to the effect of the 1976 amendments, he noted that Congress
cannot grant Art. III standing, and he concluded that Congress
had not attempted to vary the applicat1on of prudential standing
principles to this type of suit, since the 1976 amendments merely
authorized private suits against LEAA recipients that practiced
discrimination. Reviewing the legislative history, Judge Tamm
conclud ed that Congress had considered and rejected permitting a
statutory action against federal officials for failure to
terminate funding. He acknowledged that this [might] well bear
on the merits of plaintiffs' cl a ims in th is case ... However,
''[l]ike the majority," he considered it inadvis ab le to e xp ress
any view on the merits at this stage in the litigation.
11

(, __

Judge Tamm stated that plaintiffs did not have standing
merely because they objected to the usc of federal funds to
support unlawful discrimi11ation . Rather, pl~intiffs had ulleged
a distinct personal injury by c la iming that recipients of LEAA
funds had discriminated against them. Judge Tamm was still
troubled by whether the pl a inti:fs had shown an injury tbdt would
be likely to be redressed by a ~avorable decision. See Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky_ Welfar~_8..i9.hts Organizatiot~, 426 U.S. i6, 38
(1975). However, he concluded that plaintiffs should have an
opportunity to conduct discovery before this issue was finally
resolved. (Petn, at 14a.)
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'I-,.
-

prosecutor."

Bu tz v. Economou, supra, at 515.

Judge 'l'amm

disagreed with the majority's conclusion that §3766 (c) (2) granted
petrs virtually no discretion.

LEAA officials must determine

that a governmental unit has violated the nondiscrimination
provision~

seek voluntary compliance by the governmental unit

with the assistance of the chief executive of the state

involved~

decide when a reasonable time has passed after such assistance
has been unsuccessfully

requested~

and then terminate funding

only if there has been a substantial failure to comply with the
nondiscrimination provisions.

LEAA officials also have

discretion in determining whether a partial or complete
termination of funds should be ordered.

Judge Tamm reserved the

issue of whether the 1976 amendments would affect the ability of

(

LEAA officials to claim absolute immunity for conduct arising
after the effective date of those amendments.

He acknowledged

that the 1976 amendments were designed to limit the discretion of
LEAA officials in the termination of funds to recipients wh o
practiced di scr i mination.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

absolute immunity. In

The SG cont ends : (1) Pctrs are entitled to
~u t_?:._~-·

Ec:onomou r the Court statec] that

"ag ency officials must make the decision to move forw::l.rd with an
administ ~a tive

proceeding free fr om int imidation or harassmer1t."

438 U.S. at 515-516.

The Court made it cl ear that the same

protection must apply to adJnini3trative decisions not to bring
charges.

c--

Petrs' exercise of prosecutorial discretion was

precisely the type of

decision-~aking

the Court sought to

insulate from the intimidation and distortion that accompanies

-7-
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the possibility c£ personal damages liability.

Judge Tamm

correctly pointed out that the relevant statutory provisions,
like numerous other statutes governing the termination of federal
funding, require the exer cise of substantial discretion.

recipient of

Fur thermore, even if the evidence indicated that a
funds was engaged in substantial discrimination,

petrs had discretion to decline to commence a fund termination
proceeding.

Although 42

u.s.c.

§3766 (c) (2) states that "if

within a reasonable time after such notification the chief
executive fails or refuses to secure compliance, the fLEAA] shall
exercise the powers and functions provided in§ 3757," similar
mandatory language in other statutes has been interpreted as
preserving broad prosecutorial discretion.
§

547 (p roviding that

u.s.

See,~.~ .,

28

u.s.c.

Attorneys "shall prosecute for all

off enses against the United States").
In appropriate circumstances an administrative prosecutor's
decision may be subject to limited judicial review, but the
prosecutor may not be subjected to a personal damages suit.
(2)
Amendment.

Resps apparently claim that petrs violated the Fifth
Resps do not appear to assert a statu tory right to

damages, and the l'?S :i. slat i ve hi story of the Ac L: doer; not sugs; est
that Co n9ress intended to permit damages claims ag a inst LEAA
o fficials .

Petrs argued before the DC and the CA that even if

petrs were not entitled to absolute immunity, the damages claim
should be dismissed for failur0 to state a constitutional cause
of action.

The CA declineci to address this point.

Although some

local police d~partments may ha ve violated resps ' constitutional

-8-

rights, it is apparent that petrs did not.

Cf. Francis-Sobel v.

Univer sity of Maine, 597 F.2d 15 (CAl), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
949 (1979)

(dism~ssing

suit for damages against an EEOC official

for failing to give proper handling to the plaintiff's
discrimination complaint against a state univer s ity).

Since

petrs did not purposely cause or affirmatively encourage the
alleged discriminatory conduct, the discrimin ation cannot be
conside red "federal action."
(3)

The CA also erred in declining to address petrs'

contention that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a
matter of l aw .

No Supreme Court or CA decision has suggested

that the mere failure to termin a te federal funding gives rise to
a Fifth Amendment claim for damages.

Thus, petrs had no reason

to believe that their actions were violating resps '
constitutional rights.

Furthermore, nothing in resps' complaint

or the record suggests that petrs acted in bad faith.
Resps contend:

(1) The only issu e properly before this

Court is vhether petrs are entitled to absolute immunity .
other issues were not addressed by the courts below.
did not just allege a constitutional cause of action.

(2)

The
Resps

They

alleged that " petitioners' uniformr knowing fLmding of
di scriminatory law enforcement agencies violated the Fifth
Amendment , §518(c) of the Crima Con trol Act, and other federal
statutes [including 42

u.s.c.

§1985(3)) ."

Resps' Brief, at 3.

Resp s ' Fifth Amendment claim Wds based on the established
principle that "the Fed eral Gov ernme n t could not under the
Constitution give direct financial aid to [recipients] practicing

-9-
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••• disc rimination. "
(D.D.C. 1971)
404

u.s .

(1 973).

Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164

(thr ee-judge court), aff ' d' sub nom. Coit v. Green,

997 (1 971).

See also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455

(3) Resps alleged that petrs' behavior was intentional,

willful and malicious.
pursu e discovery.

Resps have not yet been permitted to

Thus, it is inappropriate for petrs to contend

that this Court should hold as a matter of law that petrs acted
in good faith.

(4)

The CA properly determined that petrs were

not entitled to absolute immunity.

LEAA officials have no

discretion with regard to initiating fund termination proceedings
once there has been a determination of discrimination.
Furthermore, the record establishes that petrs did not exercise
discretion in individual cases.

Instead, they adopted and

followed an administrative policy of never initiating fund
termination proceedings .

This policy -- set out in 28 C.P.R.

§42.206(a) --stated an agency preference for referring all
matters of noncompliance to the Justice Department for possible
litig ation, rather than initiating administrative fund
termination proceedings.S
after lbis suit was filed.
in a manner

an~logous

The policy was changed three months
Thus, LEAA officiols did not. function

to prosecu ting attorneys.

528 C. P.R. §42.206(n ) (1975) provided in part:
''[W]here the responsible Department official determines
that judicial proceedings ... are as likely or more
likely to result in co~pliance than administrative
proceedings ... he shall invo~e the judicial r at her than
the administrative remedy."

-10- ---------------------------------
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DISCUSSION:

Although petrs do not raise this issue, the
'

first issue that would confront the Court in this case if cert
were granted is whether resps have standing.
is discussed at note 2,

supr~. )

(The standing issue

I find this issue more difficult

th an the majority did, and I agree with Judge Tamm that Simon v.
Kentucl~y

Welfare Rights Organization makes the standing issue

particularly troublesome.6
The absolute immunity claim is an important issue , since
many federal statutes include fund termination provisions.
However, I am not convinced that the CA erred in rejecting petrs'
absolute immunity claim.

Although the conditions precedent to

the LEAA's obligation to initiate fund termination proceedings
involve certain subjective judgments on the part of LEAA

(.2::-'

officials (e.g. , whether there has been a "su bstantia l failure to
comply"), I do not read the Act as granting the LEAA discretion
to decline to commence fund termination proceedings even if the
LEAA has determined that all the conditions precedent have been

6simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Riqhts Organization,
2G (1976), -incorporates an injury:-In-·fact:e"lemcnt into
the threshoJd issue of stand.ing. Resps may find i.t difficult to
establish that the agencies would not have discrjm in ated against
th em if fund te rrnina~ion procc2dings hnd been brought. Petrs
contend thRt the Phi l adelphia Police Dcp't probably wo uld have
discrjminated even if a ~und termination pro:eeding had been
initiate d . Petn, at 18, n . lB. Yet resps may be able to
establish that the grant of LEA~ f unds had a "significant
tendency t.o facilitate , reinfor.;c, and support ..•
discrimination." Norwood v. Hc~r ri son , 413 u.s., at 466. See
also Green v. Connil-lly, 330F.-Supp.-ll50 (D.D.C. 1971 ), _?ff 'q
sub nom. Coit v. Green, 44 0 u.s. 997 (1971) (black school
children ha.ve stanC!ing to challenge i!.!:!Y amount of slate support
to help fund or maintain segregated schools ).
426

u.s.

-1)- ~~--~--------------~~------

c.

met.

Thus, I do not think petrs are in a position that is wholly

analogous to that of criminal prosecutors.
Petrs would surely contend that they are entitled to
absolute immunity as to each of resps' claims, although they have
only discussed resps' Fifth Amendment claim.

Resps contend that

they also allegea violations of the Act and of §1985(3).
the

CA

Neither

nor the DC discussed the various causes of action alleged

in the complaint.

The complaint is not included in the petn or

the response, and the record has not been filed with th e Court.
I

recommend calling for the record.

This should shed some light

on the standing issue, on the scope of the absolute jmrnunity
issue presented in this case, and on the second and third
questions raised in the cert petn.

(

If the Court is inclined to

grant cert to consider the absolute immunity issue, it should
consider limiting the grant to that question, since the lower
courts have not expressly considered whether the complaint states
a claim under the Fifth Amendment violation? or whether petrs aLe

entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.
complaint is well drafted ,

I

If the

imagine petrs will not be able to

prevail on those grounds at this stage of t he litigation.
There is a response.
3/17/81

Peterson

Opinion ln petn.

?Although petrs and resps claim that the CA did no t
consi der whether resps' complaint stated a claim under the Fifth
Amendment, the CA did state ir1 a footnote that petrs had a
constitutional duty not to allow federal funds to be us e d in a
discriminatory manner by recipients. Petn, at 6a, n.lS.

jo.). •
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1074

RICHARD W. VELDE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NATIONAL BLACK POLICE ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[January-, 1982]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This litigation was commenced in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 1975, and has
wended its way here in the interim without ever having gone
to trial on the "merits" of respondents' allegations of discrimination on the part of petitioners. Because we conclude, for
the reasons hereafter stated, that respondents lack standing
to maintain the claims against petitioners which they seek to
litigate in this action, we conclude, with a natural reluctance
after the amount of effort invested in the suit by the parties,
that the action should have been dismissed by the District
Court. The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit having held otherwise, the judgment of
that court is reversed and the cause remanded with appropriate instructions. Because each of the parties to the controversy has always had at least one "fall-back" position, it may
well be that the "standing" issue · was not as forcefully presented to the Court of Appeals as might have been the case,
since that Court treated the question in a footnote. But
since standing is an Art. III requirement for the exercise of
jurisdiction by the federal courts, we cannot avoid the necessity of making a determination on this point previous to the
examination of the "merits" of the other claims tendered by
the litigants.
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I
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
was established by Congress in 1968 to provide financial and
technical assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies. See Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3701-3781
(1976). 1 Congress amended the enabling statute in 1973 by
adding§ 518(c)(l), which prohibits recipients of LEAA grants
from discriminating against any person "on the ground of
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex." 87 Stat. 214, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. §3766(c)(1) (1976). 2
In 1975, respondents brought suit in United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, claiming that the LEAA
had shirked its constitutional and statutory responsibility not
to fund state and local police departments that unlawfully discriminate on the basis of race and gender. Respondents
Congress substantially restructured the LEAA in 1979. See Justice
System Improvement Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 1167, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3701-3797
(1976 ed., Supp. III). Those changes do not affect our resolution of this
case.
2
Congress also provided a mechanism for enforcing § 518(c)(l), once the
LEAA determines that a recipient of federal funds has violated its mandate. During the period relevant to this litigation, the LEAA was first
required to notify the chief executive of the State and to request that he
"secure compliance." 87 Stat. 214, 42 U. S. C. § 3766(c)(2) (1970 ed.,
Supp. V). If this effort failed , the LEAA was directed to "exercise the
powers and functions provided in section 509." Ibid. Section 509 provided that once the LEAA had determined "after reasonable notice and
opportunity for a hearing" that there had been "a substantial failure to
comply," it was to notify the grant recipient that funding would be suspended until compliance was forthcoming. 87 Stat. 211-212, 42 U. S. C.
§ 3757 (1970 ed., Supp. V).
The LEAA was also authorized to institute civil suits to compel compliance. 87 Stat. 214, 42 U. S. C. §3266(c)(2)(A) (1970 ed., Supp. V). In
addition, Congress granted the Attorney General authority to bring suit
against state or local governments to remedy a "pattern or practice" in violation of §518(c)(1). 87 Stat. 214, 42 U. S. C. §3266(c)(3) (1970 ed. ,
Supp. V).
1
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named as defendants the LEAA and the Department of Justice, as well as the four federal officials who are petitioners in
this Court. 3 The complaint sought a permanent injunction
requiring the LEAA (1) to suspend and terminate all LEAA
funding to law enforcement agencies that had been "judicially
determined to be in violation of federal civil rights laws"; (2)
to initiate hearings leading toward a suspension of funds to all
law enforcement agencies "which have been or should have
been determined by defendant LEAA to be in civil rights
non-compliance"; (3) to initiate proceedings to recover LEAA
funds unlawfully spent by these agencies; and (4) to award
funds only to agencies that are complying with the civil rights
laws. Respondents also sought $20,000,000 in damages from
petitioners for "willful[ly] and malicious[ly] refus[ing] ... to
insure that LEAA funding is not awarded to governmental
law enforcement agencies engaged in racially or sexually discriminatory employment practices." 4
The government moved to dismiss or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment. In support of these motions, the
government argued, inter alia, that respondents lacked
standing to challenge the LEAA's refusal to terminate funding. Both sets of parties submitted affidavits and memoranda, after which the District Court dismissed respondents'
complaint.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting all of the
government's contentions. 631 F. 2d 784 (CADC 1980).
Applying the doctrine of official immunity as most recently
stated in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), the court
rejected petitioners' claim of official immunity, holding that
they possessed "virtually no discretion under the relevant
The four officials were Attorney General Edward Levi, LEAA Administrator Richard Velde, LEAA Deputy Administrator Charles Work, and
the Director of the LEAA's Office of Civil Rights Compliance, Herbert
Rice.
' 1 App. 43-44.
3
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statute in deciding whether to terminate LEAA funding of
discriminatory recipients." Id., at 787. As previously indicated, the Court of Appeals treated the issue of standing in a
footnote, observing that respondents had "alleged violations
of their right to be free from federal funding of state and local
agencies that have discriminated against them." Id., at 788,
n. 16. In the court's view, this allegation was sufficient to
confer standing since it demonstrated a "personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy," Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186,
204 (1962), and fell within the "zone of interests" protected by
the statutory and constitutional provisions on which respondents' cause of action rested. Ibid. 5
We granted certiorari, 451 U. S. - - (1981), and now reverse, having concluded that respondents are without standing to obtain the relief sought in their complaint.
II

Respondents in this action are a national organization and
12 individuals, six of whom are black and six of whom are
women. 6 According to their complaint, the National Black
Police Association (NBP A) is composed of more than 50 local
and regional organizations whose members are black law enforcement personnel. By its own description, the NBP A
The dissenting judge agreed that respondents had standing, but for different reasons. He rejected the idea that respondents could satisfy the
standing requirement by "claiming an injury merely in the fact that the defendants fund unlawful discrimination, without regard to whether they
personally are victims of the discrimination." 631 F. 2d, at 789, n. 7. In
his view, however, respondents had alleged personal injury "sufficient to
resist a·motion to dismiss." Id., at 791.
• Respondents also claimed to represent a class "composed of all black
and female persons who have been discriminated against in employment on
grounds of race or sex by law enforcement agencies which have received or
currently receive LEAA funding." l-d., ttt 17. I The District Court dismissed the action before ruling on respondents' motion for class
certification.
5

11
I HPP
.

•7
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"has undertaken vast efforts in pursuit of its objectives of
achieving federal enforcement of civil rights laws requiring
equal employment opportunity for blacks and women in law
enforcement." 7 Many of its member organizations have initiated employment discrimination suits against particular law
enforcement agencies, and many of these agencies receive
grants from the LEAA.
The individual respondents reside in cities scattered
throughout the country, from Philadelphia to Honolulu.
None claims affiliation with respondent NBP A or any of its
member organizations, though they have been allies in court.
Four of the individuals sought, but were denied, employment
by local or state law enforcement agencies. At the time suit
was initiated, seven others were employed as law enforcement personnel, but had been denied promotion by their employers. One other had been employed as a police officer but
was discharged prior to commencement of this suit. Seven
of these individuals have either filed or intervened in employment discrimination suits against their actual or prospective
employers, and the remainder have filed discrimination
charges with state or federal administrative agencies. All
have complained to the LEAA of race- or gender-based
discrimination at the hands of LEAA grant recipients. 8
The nature of the injuries respondents seek to redress has
been a subject of contention since this litigation began.
Many of petitioners' arguments have been premised on the
understanding that respondents' claims of injury derive from
discriminatory treatment by their actual or prospective employers in the field of law enforcement. 9 Respondents have
' I d., at 22.
8
See id., at 26-41; 2 App. 346-493.
• In particular, petitioners have questioned the causal connection between their administration of the LEAA funding program and any discriminatory treatment by grant recipients at the state or local level. Petitioners also argued in the District Court that because of respondents'
allegations of injury at the hands of state and local law enforcement agen-
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strenuously objected to this characterization. Because a
correct understanding is central to our decision, particularly
in view of the varied composition of the respondents as a
group, we address the question of the nature of the injuries
sought to be redressed, as we interpret it from the materials
available, in some detail.
We turn first to the pleadings. In their amended complaint, respondents state their intention "to redress the violation of their constitutional and statutory rights to nondiscrimination in federally funded law enforcement programs."
1 App. 13. They allege that they have been "discriminated
against by the defendants through their refusal to terminate
LEAA funding to discriminatory law enforcement agencies."
Id., at 14. This allegation ofharm is repeated individually as
to each respondent. !d., at 14-15. 10 Each of the individual
respondents also alleges that he or she has been the victim of
employment discrimination practiced by a state or local law
enforcement agency, but none attributes this to petitioners.
The only injury attributed to petitioners consists of "their refusal to terminate LEAA funding to discriminatory law enforcement agencies." ld., at 14.
This position was clarified in memoranda submitted to the
District Court. For example, respondents explained:
"Contrary to defendants' extensive effort to have this
Court believe otherwise, plaintiffs simply do not ask this
cies, those agencies were indispensable parties whose joinder was required. Petitioners also maintained that equitable relief was unwarranted
since respondents had adequate remedies at law through suits against the
offending police departments.
10
In addition, respondent NBP A alleged that petitioners' failure to perform their civil rights obligations has harmed the organization and its members by "wholly frustrat[ing] [their] primary objectives and efforts," by
"denying equal employment rights to blacks and women," by limiting the
"pool of potential members" on which they could draw, and by requiring
them "to file administrative complaints and costly lawsuits." 1 App.
25-26.

80-1074-0PINION
VELDE v. NATIONAL BLACK POLICE ASSN.

7

Court to make findings about or enter orders designed to
alter the employment practices of local law enforcement
agencies. Rather, the 'basic evil' in this case is defendants' independent defiance of the law, not the failure of
state and local agencies to live up to their separate constitutional and statutory obligations. Regardless of the
impact the deprivation of LEAA funds might have on
the discriminatory employment practices of local agencies, ... the instant case is not dependent upon a prediction that local police departments will stop discriminating if their federal financial assistance is terminated."
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, Record 41, at 3 (emphasis in original).
Respondents emphasized that petitioners had forsaken "a
duty owed to plaintiffs not to have federal monies distributed
to discriminatory activities." I d., at 13.
At the hearing in the District Court on petitioners' motion
to dismiss or for summary judgment, counsel for respondents
reiterated:
"We do not seek any relief against police departments.
We do not have any claims of injury by police departments. This case is an action against federal officials for
what these federal officials have done, which we contend
are extreme violations of their constitutional and statutory obligations if they perform those obligations. We
don't know whether the local Police Department itself is
discriminating or not. That is not our claim." Tr. 22.
The same position was pressed in the Court of Appeals.
Respondents explained that petitioners had mistaken their
claim of injury as arising from discrimination by state and
local law enforcement agencies.
"This is not the legal injury which forms the basis of this
lawsuit. Rather, the legal injury which plaintiffs suffer
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is defendants' knowing funding of discriminatory law enforcement agencies in contravention of constitutional and
statutory obligations owed by defendants to plaintiffs."
Reply Brief for Appellants 27, quoted in 631 F. 2d, at
789, n. 7 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original).
Finally, respondents have argued in this Court that they
do not seek "to impose restrictions upon petitioners on the
basis of petitioners' relationship to discriminating grantees."
Brief for Respondents 37, n. 36. "Since [respondents'] allegations concerned the behavior and constitutional obligations
of petitioners-and not the discriminatory practices of their
grantees-any uncertainty about how those grantees might
have responded had petitioners undertaken any civil rights
enforcement efforts does not affect respondents' cause of action against petitioners." Id., at 12 (emphasis in original).
Respondents were injured "by petitioners' refusals to carry
out their constitutional and statutory civil rights obligations
and by petitioners' consequent continuation of federal funding to grantees which were also discriminating against respondents .... " I d., at 39.
III
As we stated earlier this Term, "[t]he judicial power of the
United States defined by Art. III is not an unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State,-- U.S.--,
- - (1982). "Art. III obligates a federal court to act only
when it is assured of the power to do so, that is, when it is
called upon to resolve an actual case or controversy. Then,
and only then, may it ... presume to provide a forum for the
adjudication of rights." I d., at - - , n. 13. An integral feature of Art. III's limitation of the judicial power is the requirement of standing. In Valley Forge, supra, we reviewed the blend of constitutional and prudential ingredients
that compose the concept of standing. We concluded:
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"[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the
party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U. S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury 'fairly can be
traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision,' Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)."
ld., at--.
The threshold question in this case, as in every case, is
whether respondents' allegations of injury are sufficient to
satisfy these constitutional preconditions to the exercise of
the judicial power. 11
A

Each of the individual respondents in this case has claimed
to be a victim of employment discrimination practiced by a
recipient of LEAA funds. 12 The recipient agencies, however, are not defendants in this suit, and petitioners, who
were named as defendants, have questioned the causal connection between their actions and the discriminatory treat11
Although petitioners questioned respondents' standing in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, they have chosen not to do so in this
Court. Nevertheless, we must address the issue sua sponte since our jurisdiction turns on its resolution. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 260 (1977).
12
Respondents sought to maintain this suit on behalf of a class composed
of "all black or female persons who have been discriminated against in employment" by LEAA grant recipients. 1 App. 17. The District Court
dismissed their suit prior to ruling on the motion for class certification.
Respondents' desire to act in a representative capacity, however, "adds
nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class 'must allege and show that they personally have been injured,
not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the
class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.' " Simon
v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40, n. 20 (1976)
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 502 (1975)).
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ment allegedly suffered by respondents. In reply to this
challenge, respondents have steadfastly maintained that
discrimination against them by LEAA grantees is not the injury they seek to redress. They argue that their injury consists of "petitioners' refusal to carry out their constitutional
and statutory civil rights obligations." Brief for Respondents 39.
This claim is no more an "injury" sufficient to confer standing than was the claim advanced earlier this Term in Valley
Forge, supra. The plaintiffs in Valley Forge were a national
organization and several of its members committed to maintaining the constitutional separation of church and state.
They challenged the federal government's transfer of surplus
real property to a church-affiliated school. The Court of Appeals correctly doubted plaintiffs' standing as taxpayers, but
found standing based on their allegation of "'injury in fact' to
their shared individuated right to a government that 'shall
make no law respecting the establishment of religion."'
- - U. S., at--. We rejected this conception of standing, noting that "assertion of a right to a particular kind of
government conduct, which the government has violated by
acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of
Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning."
I d. , at - - . Plaintiffs lacked standing because they had
failed to identify any personal injury suffered "as a consequimce of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation
of conduct with which one disagrees." ld., at-- (emphasis in original).
Respondents' claim of injury is of a kind with that of the
plaintiffs in Valley Forge. Respondents have asserted a
right to a government that does not provide financial assistance to law enforcement agencies that practice employment
discrimination. 13 The "injury" on which they predicate
standing is the government's failure to act according to this
13

Respondents identify several sources of this right, including the Fifth
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expectation, or in respondents' terms, the violation of "a duty
owed to plaintiffs not to have federal monies distributed to
discriminatory activities." Record 41, at 13. Without allegations of some tangible and personal consequence affecting
respondents as a result of this breach of duty, it cannot confer
standing unless the courts are to be impressed into an "amorphous general supervision of the operations of government."
United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 192 (1974) (PowELL, J., concurring). Allegations of legal right are the lingua franca of the judicial process, but they remain abstractions, inadequate to command the attention of Art. III courts
until linked to some "distinct and palpable injury," Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U. S., at 501, suffered by those who raise them.
Respondents have pointed to Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U. S. 455 (1973), to buttress their claim of standing. At
issue in Norwood was the validity of a Mississippi statutory
program under which the State loaned textbooks to nonsectarian private schools that admitted only white students.
We held that the loan program was unconstitutional because
"it significantly aid[ed] the organization and continuation of a
separate system of [segregated] private schools," id., at 467,
at a time when their marked growth in admissions coincided
with desegregation of the public schools, see id., at 457.
This program violated the State's "constitutional obligation
to steer clear, not only of operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving aid to institutions
that practice racial or other invidious discrimination." Ibid.
Respondents have alleged that petitioners are under the
same constitutional obligation, and that their failure to abide
by it, without more, constitutes a cognizable injury to reAmendment of the Federal Constitution, §§ 509 and 518(c) of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3757, 3766(c), Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq. , various other
civil rights laws, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and Executive Orders
11246 and 11375. Of course, we express no views on the validity of these
claims, or on the existence of private causes of action to enforce them.
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spondents. However much this reference to Norwood,
supra, might aid respondents' position on the merits, it adds
nothing of substance to the claim of standing we have already
discussed and rejected. One who seeks to force another to
comply with an asserted constitutional duty still must show
that he has been adversely affected in some tangible way as a
consequence of the defendant's unlawful conduct. The plaintiffs in Norwood acted on behalf of their school-aged children
who lived in a community in which all white children had been
withdrawn from the public schools and enrolled in a private,
racially segregated academy staffed by the former principal
and 17 teachers from the public school system. I d., at 467,
n. 9. They acted to protect their "personal interest ... in
admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis." Brown v. Board of Education, 349
U. S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II). Respondents' claims are
not transmuted into a similarly personal interest simply by
citation to Norwood.
B
The bases for standing asserted by respondent NBP A are
no more convincing. First, the NBP A asserts that petitioners' "refusal to enforce their constitutional and statutory civil
rights obligations has wholly frustrated [the NBPA's] primary objectives and efforts." 14 Our prior decisions have
clearly established, however, "that an organization's abstract
concern with a subject that could be affected by an adjudication does not substitute for the concrete injury required by
Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U. S. 26, 40 (1976). The NBP A's devotion to eradicating
employment discrimination in the field of law enforcement is
no more a basis for standing than the interest of the individual respondents in a government that does not fund discriminatory activities.
'

4

1 App. 25.
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The NBP A also claims injury because petitioners' conduct
"has required NBP A member organizations and their members to file administrative complaints and costly lawsuits to
obtain their civil rights." These activities, in turn, allegedly
have exposed the NBP A and its member organizations to
"extra-legal sanctions and harassment." 15 This argument is
but a variant of the position that organizational standing can
exist by virtue of the organization's commitment to goals that
might be served by a favorable decision in the matter sub
judice. That the organization has incurred financial expense
and the risk of "extra-legal harassment" is evidence of the
depth of its interest, but "a mere 'interest in a problem,' no
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how well
qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not
sufficient by itself" to establish standing. Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 739 (1972). Were the law otherwise,
an organization could demonstrate its standing to litigate any
issue simply by filing the complaint.
Since the NBP A has failed to establish injury to itself as an
organization, it can allege standing only as a representative
of its members. 16 It can do so only if those members "are
suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable
case had the members themselves brought suit." Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U. S., at 511. See Hunt v. Washington State
•• !d., at 26.
6
' The NBPA also alleged that it has been injured because petitioners'
conduct "has served to limit the already limited pool of potential members
of plaintiff NBPA and of its member organizations." Ibid. By this, the
NBPA presumably claims that persons who might otherwise have become
law enforcement personnel, and thus might have joined one of the NBPA's
member organizations, have been denied employment, or have been discharged, because of petitioners' official actions. This allegation is but another attempt to predicate standing on the NBPA's organizational interest
in the subject of this litigation, and it must therefore fail for the reasons
stated in the text. See also Part IV, infra.
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Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U. S. 333, 342-343 (1977);
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at
39-40. The NBP A's members are themselves organizations,
composed of black law enforcement personnel. Insofar as
the complaint alleges injury to those personnel, the NBP A's
claims are no different from those raised by the individual respondents in this suit. Our disposition of their claims of
standing, therefore, are also applicable to the NBPA.
IV
As we have noted, respondents have steadfastly divorced
their claims against petitioners from their treatment at the
hands of state and local law enforcement agencies who receive LEAA funds. In their brief to this Court, however,
respondents have also assumed arguendo that "petitioners'
mischaracterization of this case" was correct, i. e., that "respondents' only injury was caused not by petitioners' . . . violations but by the discrimination practiced by LEAA grantees." Brief for Respondents 40. Though respondents
reached this position reluctantly, and then only hypothetically, it is now the only remaining basis on which they can
claim standing. On the understanding that it is a claim
which might fairly be read in the complaint, we consider it,
but ultimately find it unpersuasive.

A
A litigant's claim that he has been discriminated against by
his employer or by one from whom he sought employment is
plainly a claim of injury on which Art. III standing might be
predicated. At stake is the opportunity to earn a livelihood
and to advance within one's field of work, unhampered by irrational and invidious restrictions. Respondents have made
such claims, but they have not sued their employers. They
have sued federal officials who possessed varying degrees of
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responsibility for administering programs that provide technical and financial assistance to those employers in conducting legitimate law enforcement activities.
Essential to respondents' claim of standing, therefore, are
allegations sufficient to show that the claimed injury "fairly
can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and
[is] not injury that results from the independent action of
some third party not before the court." Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S., at 41-42. 17 This
causal connection is implicit in the Art. III requirement that
a plaintiff bring to court not merely a complaint that the defendant has acted unlawfully, but a claim that in so doing he
has tangibly injured the plaintiff. If the source of plaintiff's
injury lies elsewhere, then he lacks the necessary personal
stake in the adjudication of defendant's conduct which Art.
III demands.
Respondents must also show that their injury "is likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision." I d., at 38. 18 This independent showing is necessary to assure that the decisions
of the federal courts are not merely advisory pronouncements. The judicial power does not extend to the issuance of
decrees that are ineffective to remedy the injury on which a
17
See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa·
tion of Church and State,- U. S. - , - (1982); Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation,- U . S . - , - (1981); Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S., at 261;
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 504 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
u. s. 614, 617-618 (1973).
8
' See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, supra, a t - ; Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, supra, a t - ; Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 100 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, supra, at 72, 75 n. 20; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., supra, at 262; Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 504; Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., supra, at 618.
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litigant's claim of standing is predicated. These requirements are but natural corollaries of the more fundamental
principle that the power of the federal courts to declare the
rights of individuals and to measure the authority of governments "is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity
in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy."
Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339,
345 (1892).
The conclusion that respondents have failed to satisfy either requirement is virtually compelled by our rejection of a
similar claim of standing in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra. In Simon, the plaintiffs were indigents and several organizations representing indigents who
brought suit against the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, challenging a Revenue
Ruling that allowed favorable tax treatment to nonprofit hospitals that offered only emergency-room services to indigents. Most of the plaintiffs alleged that they had been denied access to hospital services on account of their poverty,
and that each of the hospitals involved had taken advantage
of the Revenue Ruling by securing tax-exempt charitable status. Plaintiffs argued that the Internal Revenue Code compelled defendants to deny tax-exempt status to hospitals that
refused to provide them full service.
We recognized that denial of access to medical services was
an injury on which standing might be predicated. We observed, however, that
"injury at the hands of a hospital is insufficient by itself
to establish a case or controversy in the context of this
suit, for no hospital is a defendant. The only defendants
are officials of the Department of the Treasury, and the
only claims of illegal action respondents desire the courts
to adjudicate are charged to those officials. . . . [T]he
'case or controversy' limitation of Art. III still requires
that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly
can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,
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and not injury that results from the independent action
of some third party not before the court." 426 U. S., at
41-42.
We accepted plaintiffs' allegation that the challenged Revenue Ruling had "encouraged" hospitals to deny services to
indigents, but we nevertheless rejected their claim of standing. First, we found it "purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can be traced
to petitioners' 'encouragement' or instead result[ed] from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications." Id., at 42-43. Second, we found it "equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial
powers in this suit would result in the availability to [plaintiffs] of such services." I d., at 43. It was "just as plausible
that the hospitals to which [plaintiffs] may apply for service
would elect to forego favorable tax treatment to avoid the undetermined financial drain of an increase in the level of uncompensated services." Ibid.
Respondents' position in this case is no more tenable than
that of the plaintiffs in Simon. Respondents allege that they
have been discriminated against by state and local law enforcement agencies. As in Simon, however, the defendants
are not those alleged to have inflicted the injury, but federal
officials whose administration of statutory programs has resulted in a financial benefit to those persons. Whether the
discriminatory treatment is fairly traceable to petitioners' refusal to terminate LEAA funding or whether it is instead
attributable to the independent decisions of the state and
local agencies is at least as speculative as the causal connection examined in Simon. Indeed, unlike the plaintiffs in
Simon, who alleged that the defendants' Revenue Ruling
"encouraged" the hospitals to deny them services, respondents have made no similar claims in their amended complaint.
We also lack confidence that the relief sought by respondents would end the employment discrimination under which
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they claim to have labored. Respondents have prayed for an
order requiring the LEAA to suspend funding to all law enforcement agencies "which have been or should have been determined by defendant LEAA to be in civil rights non-compliance." 19 Whether such an order would provide respondents jobs where employment was denied, or promotion where
an opportunity for advancement was restricted, is, as in
Simon, a matter of "unadorned speculation." I d., at 44.
Respondents plainly attribute their frustration in the workplace to racial or gender-based discrimination, but there is no
reasonable assurance that the LEAA will, or ought to, concur in that judgment. Even in those instances in which fund
termination would be guaranteed by the order requested-as
where the LEAA or a court has already found employment
discrimination by a respondent's employer and that employer
still has not complied with the law-the likelihood that the
employer will in turn provide respondent favorable treatment depends on a chain of speculative inferences that is simply too tenuous to establish standing. 20

1 App. 44.
Some law enforcement agencies may indeed subscribe to racial or gender-based criteria in their hiring or promotion decisions, and they may reluctantly suppress their prejudices in order to preserve federal funding.
This in turn may benefit respondents. In other instances, however, the
agencies may value particular methods of selecting or promoting personnel
that have nothing to do with racial or gender-based animus. They may
conclude that these methods are more valuable to law enforcement than
LEAA funding, and they may decide to forego federal assistance rather
than sacrifice them. All of these possibilities, of course, depend on the extent to which the agencies are dependent on federal assistance, the values
they assign to the practices respondents have challenged, and the connection between those practices and respondents' misfortunes. As in Simon,
"the complaint suggests no substantial likelihood that victory in this suit
would result in respondents' receiving the ... treatment they desire."
426 U. S., at 45-46.
'

9

20
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B

Anticipating our concern about the redressability aspect of
standing, respondents again seek to derive support from
Norwood v. Harrison, supra. The District Court in that
case upheld the State's textbook loan program, in part because the plaintiffs failed to prove that elimination of textbook loans to discriminatory private schools would cause children to leave them and enroll in public schools. See 413
U. S., at 465. We accepted this factual uncertainty, but
held that
"the Constitution does not permit the State to aid
discrimination even when there is no precise causal relationship between state financial aid to a private school
and the continued well-being of that school. A State
may not grant the type of tangible financial aid here involved if that aid has a significant tendency to facilitate,
reinforce, and support private discrimination." I d., at
465-466.
Respondents' reliance on this language is again misplaced.
The question in Norwood was whether the State had violated
the Constitution by loaning textbooks to private academies
whose admissions policies were racially discriminatory. The
question was not, as it is here, whether the plaintiffs had
standing to raise that constitutional question. As we have
already noted, the plaintiffs in Norwood represented black
schoolchildren who lived in a community in which all white
children had withdrawn from the public schools in reaction to
the process of desegregation and had enrolled in segregated
academies which the State aided through its loan program.
As we observed in a later decision, "[t]he plaintiffs in Norwood were parties to a school desegregation order and the relief they sought was directly related to the concrete injury
they suffered." Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S.
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556, 570--571, n. 10 (1974). Indeed, in Gilmore we expressed
doubt about the plaintiffs' standing to challenge conduct not
reasonably related to the preservation of the existing decree.
Ibid.
The plaintiffs in Norwood suffered from discriminatory
treatment within a dual school system established and maintained by the State. They had secured a remedial decree directed against the State, and they were acting to prevent the
State from circumventing or undermining that decree by
"significantly aid[ing] the organization and continuation of a
separate system of private schools." Norwood v. Harrison,
supra, at 467. The respondents in this case have alleged employment discrimination, not by petitioners, but by state and
local agencies who have not been named as defendants. A
fortiori, they are not seeking in this action to preserve the efficacy of remedial decrees already entered against those
agencies. They are suing federal officials charged with administering programs that have aided the agencies in performing legitimate activities. Whether they would succeed
in proving a constitutional violation on the merits is not relevant in establishing a substantial likelihood that the relief
they seek will alleviate the injury they claim.

c
At oral argument before this Court, counsel for respondents maintained that one of the individual respondents, Joel
Michelle Schumacher, had established standing because a
threat by the LEAA to terminate funding to the New Orleans Police Department, who had denied her employment,
caused the Department to eliminate the hiring criteria that
Schumacher had alleged to be discriminatory. According to
counsel, this satisfied the redressability aspect of standing
with respect to respondent Schumacher. Citing our decision
earlier this Term in Watt v. Energy Action Educational
Foundation, - - U. S. - - (1981), counsel argued that her
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standing was sufficent to allow the action to proceed, regardless of whether the other respondents could also establish
standing.
The record does disclose allegations that respondent
Schumacher sought employment with the New Orleans Police Department, but was denied a job because she did not
meet the Department's minimum height requirement. 21 In
early 1975 she filed a complaint with the LEAA's Office of
Civil Rights Compliance, alleging that the height requirement discriminated on the basis of sex. She also sought to
intervene in a suit against the Department pending in federal
court which also challenged the height requirement. The
LEAA eventually threatened to terminate its funding and to
"notify the Office of Revenue Sharing and other interested
federal agencies" if the Department did not abolish the height
restriction. 22 In response, the Superintendent of Police recommended to the City's Civil Service Commission that the
requirement be eliminated. 23
In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), a developer and three individuals
challenged a municipality's denial of a rezoning request that
would have permitted the developer to construct low-cost
housing in which the individual respondents wished to live.
We found that one of the individuals had demonstrated standing, and it was therefore unnecessary to consider whether
the other plaintiffs and intervenors had standing to maintain
the suit. Id., at 263-264 and n. 9. In Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, supra, we considered a challenge to the Secretary of the Interior's decision not to use
1 App. 34.
App. to Defendants' "Statement of Reasons, " Record 36, at 6.
23
This action was taken "in light of the imminent threat of the loss of
LEAA funding to the New Orleans Police Department as well as the threat
to our City's general revenue sharing funds." Letter from Superintendent
of Police Clarence Giarrusso to Andrew Strojny, LEAA Office of Civil
Rights Compliance 3 (Oct. 29, 1975), Record 36, Exh. 10.
21

22
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particular bidding systems in leasing tracts for oil and gas exploration on the Outer Continental Shelf. We found that the
State of California had established standing to challenge the
Secretary's decision and consequently we did not consider the
claims of the other plaintiffs. I d., at - - .
In both cases, all of the plaintiffs were aggrieved by the
same decision. Given the nature of the decisions challenged,
once the standing of one plaintiff was established, the standing of the remaining plaintiffs became superfluous. The first
plaintiff fully demonstrated an injury redressable by the
court which fairly could be traced to a decision of which the
remaining plaintiffs also complained. This case, however,
arises in a different context. The individual respondents
have each alleged different injuries, consisting of various
forms of discriminatory treatment by different LEAA grant
recipients. The conduct of which they complain consists of a
variety of individual decisions regarding termination of funds
to different recipients. Obviously, the nature of those decisions, as well as their effect on the individual respondents,
will vary from case to case.
In addition, the respondents seek not merely injunctive relief, but damages, which are not shared by all of them in
equal degree. "[W]hatever injury may have been suffered is
peculiar to the individual . . . , and both the fact and extent of
injury would require individualized proof." Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S., at 515-516. Thus, even if respondent Schumacher has established standing as to her own claim, she is
without standing either to question petitioners' decisions to
continue funding other law enforcement agencies throughout
the country, or to seek damages on behalf of other individuals
who might have been injured as a consequence.
We have also determined, however, that respondent
Schumacher has not established standing to press her own
claim, much less the claims of others. The injury that she
alleges, the denial of employment with the New Orleans Police Department, is no more "fairly traceable" to petitioners'
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funding decisions than the claimed injuries of the other respondents. The decision to adopt a height requirement was
certainly not unique to LEAA grant recipients, and "unadorned speculation" is required to link that decision to petitioners' administration of the LEAA assistance program.
In addition, although the LEAA eventually did threaten to
terminate funding, and although the Police Department
thereafter eliminated the height requirement, this establishes only that at the time the amended complaint was filed,
respondent Schumacher's prospects for employment were no
longer barred by the allegedly discriminatory practice of
which she complained. 24 It does not establish that whatever
injury remains is redressable by a suit against petitioners
challenging their failure to threaten fund termination. That
connection is still speculative. It depends on the assumptions that petitioners should have determined earlier than
they did that the Police Department was practicing gender
discrimination and that the Police Department would then
have eliminated the requirement as a result of the LEAA's
threat to terminate its funding. Indeed, whether the Department's actual decision to abandon the height requirement
was attributable to that threat, rather than the companion
threat to place the City's revenue sharing funds in jeopardy
or the risk of an adverse judgment in the civil rights suit
against the Department then pending in federal court, is itself a matter of speculation. 25
Respondents' amended complaint, which included respondent Schumacher's allegations that the LEAA had improperly failed to terminate
funding, was filed several months after the LEAA had threatened fund
termination and the New Orleans Police Department had abandoned the
height requirement.
25
It is argued that a decision on respondents' standing should be delayed
until they have an opportunity to conduct discovery and establish their
standing in evidentiary proceedings. The District Court granted judgment for petitioners before respondents had such an opportunity. Nevertheless, respondents obtained extensive information from the LEAA
24

J
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v
The claim of injury on which respondents have relied
throughout this litigation is insufficient to establish their
standing to maintain suit. The claim of injury which they
have belatedly raised in this Court is sufficiently concrete for
purposes of Art. III, but it is not fairly traceable to the
wrongdoing they ascribe to petitioners, nor is it substantially
probable that the relief they seek would alleviate their injury. Consequently, the courts below were without jurisdiction to hear this suit, and it must be dismissed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

through the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552, while suit was
pending in the District Court, Tr. of Oral Arg. 44, and they submitted numerous affidavits in response to petitioners' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Nor have respondents complained of the lack of discovery in answering objections to their standing, since they have relied on a
claim of injury consisting of petitioners' failure to enforce the civil rights
laws.
Moreover, we have held that the question of standing normally is to be
determined on the pleadings, with leave to support the complaint by affidavits. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 115, n. 31
(1979); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 45
and n. 25; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 501-502. In addition, the pleadings "must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the
conceivable." United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 688 (1973). It is
the responsibility of the complainant to "allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally
would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention." Warth v.
Seldin, supra, at 508. The respondents have failed to allege facts sufficient to establish their standing, and given the nature of the deficiencies, it
is improbable that discovery from petitioners would supply the missing
links.
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(Slip Opinion)
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1074
RICHARD W. VELDE, ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. NATIONAL BLACK POLICE ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June

30, 1982]

PER CURIAM.
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit for further consideration in light of Harlow &
Butterfield v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. (1982).
JUSTICE POWELL and JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case.
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